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Turkey and Israel enjoyed an almost perfect relationship throughout the 1990s that
amazed their friends, yet bothered their rivals.  The US war in Iraq revealed,
however, that the two longstanding allies did indeed have contradictory objectives
and concerns with respect to the future restructuring of Iraq. While Turkey fears
the emergence of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, the same
possibility seems favorable for Israel from its security standpoint, vis-à-vis threats
posed by countries like Iran, Pakistan, and beyond. It appears that the “amazing
alliance” is heading toward a crossroads. Such an eventuality may change the
nature of the relationship from a “win-win” to a “lose-lose” situation unless
proper steps are rapidly taken with a view toward rebuilding confidence on both
sides.
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The military campaign of the United States against Saddam Husayn in Iraq has
caused much damage on both sides,  in terms of casualties and devastation. The death
toll in the streets of Iraqi cities and towns rises daily. Many incidents that would be
labeled as, at least, “tragic” a few years ago now turn out to be ordinary data entries
for daily statistics. An assessment of the US Central Intelligence Agency outlined
three possibilities for Iraq through the end of 2005 “with the worst case being devel-
opments that could lead to civil war.”1  Contrary to some relatively optimistic sce-
narios that have been discussed in the immediate aftermath of the general elections
1.  See Douglas Jehl, “US Intelligence Shows Pessimism On Iraq’s Future,” The New York Times,
September 16, 2004, pp. A1 & A6.
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held on January 30, 2005, the future of Iraq is still uncertain in many respects. America’s
war has also caused much uncertainty about the future of some of the long established
relationships among the states in the region. In this context, the deeply rooted Turk-
ish-Israeli relationship2  also shows signs of being a victim of “collateral damage”
from the war in Iraq.
In the aftermath of the toppling of Saddam Husayn’s regime in April 2003, it
became apparent that Israel and Turkey might indeed have conflicting objectives and
concerns with regard to the future restructuring of Iraq. When the United States set on
to achieve its political goal of establishing a democratic regime in Iraq, the political
climate between Turkey and Israel began to worsen. The US effort required the hold-
ing of free elections in Iraq to form a representative body, as the first step towards
democratization.3  These elections affected the sensitive fabric of Iraqi society as the
various groups making up the complex demographic structure of the country each
began to make claims which could hardly be universally met.  Among these is the
conflict between those seeking a secular state, who see it as essential to a modern
society, and the effort by Shi‘i clerics to see that the legal system conforms to the
shari‘a. Meanwhile the Kurds, who constitute perhaps 20% of the population, insisted
on a veto over any proposed constitution which did not satisfy their demands for
autonomy. Others criticized this as anti-democratic because a minority was in effect
holding the majority hostage.
Turkey has always been uneasy about the aspirations of Iraqi Kurds; any pros-
pect of Iraq coming apart and the emergence of an indepdendent Kurdish entity in
northern Iraq produces wariness among Turkish statesmen and the military alike.
While Turkey, once Israel’s strategic ally,4  is searching for ways to prevent the cre-
ation of a Kurdish state out of Iraqi territory, Israel may be more than happy to see a
powerful autonomous Kurdish authority or an independent state in northern Iraq.
Since, speculative though it may be, a Kurdish entity with which Israel could con-
clude, inter alia, a comprehensive military cooperation agreement might be highly
beneficial for Israel’s security. For reasons that will be elaborated later in this article,
such an agreement might enable Israel to build a forward defense capability against
potential and active threats emanating from countries such as Iran, Pakistan and be-
yond, in the medium to long-term.5
2.  See for instance George Gruen, “Dynamic Prospects in Turkish-Israeli Relations,” Israel Affairs
(Summer 1995), Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 44. Also see Daniel Pipes, “A New Axis: The Emerging Turkish-Israeli
Entente,” The National Interest (Winter 1997/98), p. 35.
3.  After long speculation about whether the elections could be carried out at all, Iraqi citizens from all
segments of society went to the ballot boxes on January 30, 2005. As of the date of publication the new
National Assembly was still in the process of forming a government; although turnout had been high in
Shi‘i and Kurdish areas, the Sunni Arab population had largely avoided voting.
4.  See, for instance, Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and Israel Strategize” Middle East Quarterly
(Winter 2002), Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 61–65; Also available at www.meforum.org/article/128.
5. The argument here is not to suggest that Israel is definitely drawing plans to create a Kurdish
political entity all by itself.
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Therefore, it is quite understandable why Israeli authorities in particular, and
the Jewish community in the United States, give support, or at least do not oppose (as
much as the Turks would like to see) the efforts of the Kurdish groups lobbying both
in Iraq and elsewhere to achieve their grandiose objective, namely the creation of an
independent Kurdistan. Moreover, the moral affinity between the histories of the Jews
and the Kurds, in which the former managed to achieve their own state only after long
and painstaking deliberations, needs to be kept in mind here.6  There are approxi-
mately 160,000 Jewish Kurds (or Kurdish Jews) who are citizens of Israel, most of
whom, or whose ancestors, emigrated from Iraq decades ago. Some of these Kurdish
Jews are buying land and other intangibles and investing in northern Iraq. One should,
therefore, acknowledge the facts and the reasons behind the moral support, if nothing
else, given to the Kurds by Israelis and by Jews in general.7  However, even this kind
of moral support may itself further the deterioration of Turkish-Israeli relations in the
years to come.8
Against this background, this article aims to give an account of how Turkey and
Israel are approaching a crossroads in their strategic relations because of their appar-
ently conflicting views and attitudes about the future political and constitutional re-
structuring of Iraq.9  The policies followed by Turkish policy-makers during the pre-
war period vis-à-vis US policies toward Iraq are said to be primarily responsible for
such an outcome.10  It was argued that, had Turkey managed to play properly its
crucial role in America’s wartime strategy, it would have had the upper hand in the
shaping of the future of Iraq in lieu of the Kurds, who constitute the majority of the
6. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 called for the partition of the British-ruled
Palestine Mandate into a Jewish state and an Arab state. It was approved on November 29, 1947 with 33
votes in favor, 13 against, 10 abstentions and one absent. See the Resolution Adopted on the Report of the
Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (www.un.org). The Resolution was accepted by the
Jews in Palestine, yet rejected by the Arabs in Palestine and the Arab states. Israel proclaimed indepen-
dence on 14 May 1948. On this account, see Joseph Heller, The Birth of Israel 1945 - 1949: Ben Gurion
and his Critics, University Press of Florida, Tampa, 2000. Also see John Bright, A History of Israel,
Third Edition (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981). For a different perspective see Gerald Butt, The
Arabs: Myth and Reality, (London & New York: I. B. Tauris, 2001), pp. 85-149.
7.  Interview with Hagit Ben Yaakov, Israeli Embassy in Ankara, October 2002.
8.  Turkey, whose population is predominantly Muslim, was one of the first countries to recognize the
state of Israel in 1949 and to establish diplomatic relations since then. See Faruk Sonmezoglu Turk Dis
Politikasinin Analizi [Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy], (Istanbul: Der Yayinlari, 1998).
9.  Strangely enough, Turkey and Israel used to amaze the political and security elite on both sides
until very recently with the degree of their strategic cooperation, especially in the security field. For a
view from Turkey, see Cevik Bir and Martin Sherman, “Formula for Stability: Turkey Plus Israel,”
Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), Vol. 9, No. 4. pp. 23-32. For an Israeli perspective, see Ilan Berman,
“Israel, India and Turkey: Triple Entente?,” Middle East Quarterly (Fall 2002), Vol. 9, No. 4. pp. 33-40.
10. A  look at the Turkish media in the wake of the vote in the Turkish Parliament on March 1, 2003,
and especially after the fall of Saddam Husayn and the reported atrocities of Kurdish militia that followed
in northern Iraqi cities inhabited by Turkomans, will provide a host of articles and commentaries harshly
criticizing the policy pursued by the Turkish government.
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population in the northern sectors of that country. As such, it would not now have to
be at odds with Israel concerning post-Saddam Iraq. It is, therefore, worth looking
into a series of events that took place in the Turkish political and military realms in
the months and weeks leading up to the war in Iraq. It is equally worth analyzing, in
this respect, how and why these events caused Turkish-American relations to suffer
serious setbacks. Therefore, the second section of this article aims to shed light to the
background of negotiations between Turkey and the United States, which resulted in
a failure to secure the approval of the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
Deterioration of Turkey’s relations with the United States did have an equally, if not
more, negative impact on its relations with Israel. In such a political atmosphere, the
influence of the Jewish lobby, which is very active on Capitol Hill, and of the Jewish-
Americans who occupy important posts in the US Administration, on the policies of the
United States toward Iraq in general, and toward the Kurdish groups in particular, became
a subject of intense political as well as public discourse in Turkey. Israel was generally
portrayed in Turkey as being the essential actor drawing the plans for the future of Iraq
behind the scenes, and asking the US Administration to execute them.11  Although an
argument along the lines of “Israel has a vested interest in shaping the future of Iraq,” was
frequently mentioned in such discourses, no substantiating arguments were properly put
forward. Thus, the third section of this article is an attempt to investigate, to the extent
possible, the concerns as well as the would-be objectives of Israeli policy-makers with
regard to the future of Iraq, and to put forward arguments that may explain why Israel
may have a potential interest in northern Iraq.
In the international arena, states rarely and only occasionally declare and/or
publish their true intentions (e.g., white papers). Yet, it is possible to estimate the
probable intentions and actions of states. One way is to make a proper assessment of
their threat perceptions, and to determine the most effective ways to counter them,
since every state will seek to take effective measures with respect to the threats they
perceive. The third section of this article attempts to analyze how and why an autono-
mous or independent Kurdish political entity in northern Iraq might be extremely
crucial for the ultimate security of Israel, a country which perceives itself as encircled
by enemies and exposed to existential threats.12
Finally, having discussed Turkey’s concerns with the emergence of an independent
11. See for example Hikmet Erdogdu, Buyuk Israil Stratejisi, [Grand Israeli Strategy] (Istanbul: IQ
Kultur Sanat Yayinlari, 2005). Also see, Prof. Dr. Cemal Anadol, Israil ve Siyonism Kiskacinda Turkiye
[Israel and Turkey Knotted with Zionism] (Second Edition), (Istanbul: Bilen Karinca, 2004).
12. A number of articles published on this matter and the interviews conducted over the last few years
with various people at key positions in diplomatic, political and military spheres in Israel and in the
United States, some of whom wish to remain anonymous, assisted in understanding how Israel’s
security could be enhanced if cooperative relations with a Kurdish entity in northern Iraq could be
established over time. Those who expressed views on how important such a cooperative scheme would
be from the Israeli standpoint did not necessarily want to undermine the importance of the relations with
Turkey. However, it was emphasized that compatibility of these two relationships would be difficult to
achieve.
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Kurdish state in Iraq, and having assessed the potential role that such a state might  play in
the security of Israel in the future, the concluding section of the article comments on the
degree of possible damage that can be caused to the future of the relations between Turkey
and Israel due to their apparently clashing interests over northern Iraq.
POLITICAL CLIMATE IN TURKEY PRIOR TO THE WAR
Basing tens of thousands of American troops on Turkey’s soil was thought to be
a key part of US contingency planning in the war against Iraq. Representatives of the
two countries conducted a series of negotiations to this effect.13  In the meantime the
three-party coalition in Turkey, led by Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, went to early
elections and was then replaced by the single-party government of  the Justice and
Development Party (AKP), which won two-thirds of the 550 seats in the Turkish
Grand National Assembly.14  The new Turkish government resumed the negotiations
from the point where they were stalled, and decided to draft a resolution that would
allow American Special Forces to be deployed in Turkey in order to cross the border
into Iraqi territory, as part of a plan to encircle the Iraqi forces along with the US and
British troops deployed in the south to march toward Baghdad.15  But, the resolution,
which was tabled before the Turkish Grand National Assembly on March 1, 2003,
failed, as the total number of “no” votes together with the abstentions exceeded the
number of “yes” votes.16  This development upset the pre-war strategies of the Penta-
gon and caused fractures in the relations of the two longstanding allies.17
13. Turkey’s importance in the US war plans were underscored during a meeting of a Turkish
delegation headed by the then Undersecretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador
Ugur Ziyal, with their American counterparts. For details of this meeting see Fikret Bila, Sivil Darbe
Girisimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaslari [Civilian Coup Attempt and the Iraq Wars in Ankara], (Ankara:
Umit Yayincilik, 2003), p.171.
14. The three-party coalition consisted of the Democratic Left Party (DSP) chaired by the then Prime
Minister Bulent Ecevit, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) chaired by Devlet Bahceli, then Deputy
Prime Minister, and the Motherland Party (ANAP) chaired by Mesut Yilmaz, who did not take part in the
government. As a result of the worsening of the economic situation in Turkey following two severe
financial crises, the coalition partner MHP called for early elections to be held in November 2002. Many
political analysts considered this to be a suicidal decision for the coalition, which ultimately led to its
replacement by the newly established AKP chaired by Recep Tayyip Erdogan,  who was sworn in as a
deputy first, and then Prime Minister a few months later due to some legal technicalities that had to be
overcome through by-elections in February 2003.
15. The difficulties that were encountered during the negotiations were sometimes reflected to media.
See David A. Sanger and Dexter Filkins, “US is Pessimistic Turks Will Accept the Deal on Iraq,” The
New York Times, February 20, 2003, pp. A1 & A13.
16. The resolution was not approved with 264 votes in favor to 251 votes against and with 19
abstentions. See Dexter Filkins, “Turkish Deputies Refuse to Accept American Troops,” The New York
Times, March 2, 2003, pp. A1 & A13.
17.  Deterioration of the relations was reflected in public statements made by high-ranking officials
on both sides. For the words of Robert Pearson, then US Ambassador to Ankara see agency news
compiled by TDN staff “Defeat Presented with Sugar Coating,” Turkish Daily News, March 3, 2003, pp.
A1 & A14.
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Misunderstanding and miscalculations by the two countries had created pro-
found tensions that were then thought to be highly likely to endure.18  The failure to
implement this pre-war strategy forced the American Administration to resort to an
alternative plan,19  which heavily relied on the militia-like units (peshmergas) of the
Kurdish forces in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of Mas‘ud
Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani.20  In the ab-
sence of Turkey’s active contribution to the US military campaign against Saddam
Husayn, the war produced disappointing results for Turkey in two ways. First, Turkey’s
relations with its staunch ally for decades, the United States, suffered serious rup-
tures.21  Second, the outcome that was most unwanted by Turkey (i.e., reliance on the
Kurdish groups concentrated in the north in the political restructuring of Iraq over the
other ethnic/religious groups that are spread all over the country) strengthened the
Kurds.22  Hence, decision-makers, civilian and military bureaucrats, and  intellectuals
in Turkey sought to assess what had gone wrong and how to reverse the undesirable
developments which the US alternative reliance on the Kurds had produced, as well as
to repair Turkish-US relations.23
There has been much speculation about why Turkey was reluctant to allow US
troops to use Turkish soil. Some argued that Turkey wanted more, and thus resorted
to Middle Eastern bargaining techniques with a view to capitalizing on the country’s
estate value.24  Some went even further to claim that Turkey had hidden desires con-
cerning the oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk provinces in northern Iraq, which were gov-
erned by the Turks for centuries until the First World War, then lost to the British.25
Hence, it was alleged that Turkey was conducting secret negotiations with the United
States to that effect.26  None of these claimed motives was remotely close to the truth.
18. See Frank Buruni, “US Ties to Turkey May Face Enduring Strain, Officials Say,” The New York
Times, March 24, 2003, p. B13.
19. The US Administration kept its hopes alive for a while but then set out to put an alternative plan
into operation. See agency news compiled by TDN staff “US Still Hopeful Turkey Will Allow Troop
Deployment,” Turkish Daily News, March 4, 2003 pp. A1 & A14. Also see Steven Weisman, “Powell
Says US Can Wage War On Iraq Without Turks,” The New York Times, March 5, 2003, p. A11.
20. See David Rohde, “If War Hits, Kurds See Way To Grab Old Lands,” The New York Times,
March 14, 2003, p. A13.
21. The term “staunch ally” was used by the US President George Bush, the father, with regard to
Turkey for the first time back in 1990. See George Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing the
Deployment of United States Armed Forces to Saudi Arabia, August 8, 1990”, Public Papers of the
Presidents of the United States 1990, Vol. 1, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991, pp.
1107 - 1109.
22. See William Safire, “The Kurdish Ghost,” The New York Times, March 3, 2003, p. A23.
23. See Dexter Filkins, “Turkey needs week or more to reconsider US request,” The New York Times,
March 4, 2003, p. A10.
24. See Eric Schmitt and Dexter Filkins, “Turkey Demands $32 Billion US Aid Package If It Is To
Take Part in a War On Iraq,” The New York Times, February 19, 2003, p. A15.
25. See Mete Belovacikli, “Clash of Intentions,” Turkish Daily News, February 28, 2003, p. 14.
26. See Dexter Filkins and C. J. Chivers, “US In Talks On Allowing Turkey To Occupy A Kurdish
Area In Iraq,” The New York Times, March 7, 2003, pp. A1 & A12.
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With respect to the bargaining issue, it suffices to say that money discussions with
foreigners was traditionally unpopular among Turkish politicians, especially in times
of crisis or war. Representatives of a traditional warrior culture would be ashamed if
they traded the security of their people for money, regardless of the amount of cash at
stake or the level of economic hardship in the country.27
The claims of a secret deal with the US to annex Mosul and Kirkuk to Turkey
were also unfounded. It is true that the Mosul province of the Ottoman Empire, which
covered the entire territory that is now known as northern Iraq including Kirkuk,
Erbil and Sulaymaniyya, was  included in the National Oath that was declared by the
First Turkish Parliament in 1920 during the War of Liberation led by Mustafa Kemal
(Atatürk) against the occupying powers.28  Following the proclamation of the Repub-
lic of Turkey in 1923 as a result of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey conducted intense
negotiations with Britain, then the world’s superpower, until 1925,29  but it failed to
convince the League of Nations that the Mosul province should belong to Turkey.30
Since then, no matter how difficult it may have been for many Turks to acknowledge
such a decision, it is a fact of life and has been fully honored by Turkey, so long as all
the other parties also honored their commitments, and provided no ethnic and/or
religious group sought to claim sovereignty. Turkey even restrained itself despite
reports of some actions by the Kurdish peshmergas following the fall of the Saddam
regime, which could have provided an incentive if Turkey really was seeking to annex
Mosul and Kirkuk. But since such an irresponsible act would have further compli-
cated the already tense relations of the parties concerned, Turkey acted with restraint.31
27. Interview with Ambassador Yasar Yakis, then Turkish Foreign Minister, March 2003, Bilkent
University, Ankara. Foreign Minister Yakis presided over the Turkish delegation during the early phase
of the negotiations with their American counterparts in January and February 2003.
28. See Stanford J. Shaw, From Empire to Republic: The Turkish War of National Liberation, 1918
- 1923, (Ankara: Turk Tarih Kurumu,  2001). For a comprehensive study on the making of modern
Turkey see Erik J. Zurcher, Turkey: A Modern History, (London and New York: I. B. Tauris & Co.
Limited,  2001) (New Revised Edition).
29. Daniel Silverfarb, Britain’s Informal Empire in the Middle East, (Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.)
30. The Mosul problem was one of the unresolved issues at the Lausanne negotiations which resulted
in a Treaty on July 24, 1923 that paved the way to the foundation of the modern Republic of Turkey on
October 29, 1923. During the negotiations, it was agreed to form a commission under the auspices of the
League of Nations in 1924 with a view to finding a compromising solution between the British and the
Turks who had divergent views on the status of the Mosul province. Turks claimed that Mosul was
inherently a Turkish city while the British maintained, on the contrary, that the demographic structure of
the region did not substantiate Turkey’s claims. Finally, after long deliberations, the Council of the
League of Nations decided in 1926 to rely on the commission’s report that literally was completely in line
with the position of the British in this debate. See David Fromkin, A Peace to End all Peace: The Fall of
the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of Modern Middle East, (New York: Avon Books, 1989).
31. See Frank Buruni, “Turkey Denies Reports That Its Troops Defied US And Entered Iraq,” The
New York Times, March 23, 2003, p. B7.
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TURKISH CONCERNS ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTHERN IRAQ
If these were not the reasons for Turkish rejection of the US forces, what were?
Since its foundation, the Republic of Turkey has faced internal as well as external
challenges. Leaving aside the external challenges, two major internal threats have
always been at the top of the security agenda of Turkish policy-makers, be they civil-
ian or military. The first is religious fundamentalism, which is strongly believed to
aim at reconstituting the shari‘a  in the country or bringing back the Caliphate, both
of which were abolished by Atatürk.32  The second is ethnic separatism by the Kurdish
population living mostly in the southeastern districts of the country.33
The war in Iraq could very well have triggered internal conflict in Turkey in
either or both of these areas. There were mass demonstrations countrywide,34  particu-
larly around the mosques, against government policies that supported Turkey’s stand-
ing with the United States, whose President had once mentioned a “Crusade” after the
events of September 11, 2001.35  The constituents of the single-party government
formed by the AKP are mostly active practitioners of Islam.36  Therefore, it was no
surprise that the government encountered serious difficulty in convincing its deputies
to vote in favor of the troop basing resolution.37  And this indeed happened.
On the other hand, at the beginning of the crisis in the fall of 2002, the military
adopted the utmost caution in its stance vis-à-vis the issue of US troop deployment in
Turkey, so as not to make any statement that could ignite mass reactions against the
32.  Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (“father of all Turks”), the founder and the first President of the Republic
of Turkey, abolished the Sultanate in 1922 just prior to the commencement of the Lausanne peace
negotiations in Switzerland after the War of Liberation was fought and won against the occupying
powers. The reason for the abolishment was to have only one Turkish delegation representing the
interests of the Turkish people. However, the organizers of the Lausanne negotiations, the British in
particular, had invited both the Ottoman Sultan as well as the representatives of victorious warriors led
by Mustafa Kemal. The Caliphate was also abolished soon after the declaration of the Republic of
Turkey, which was created as a secular state by its Constitution.
33. A comprehensive assessment of the threats perceived by the Turkish military and the government
can be found in the white papers that are occasionally published. See for instance, Beyaz Kitap [White
Paper] (Ankara: Ministry of Defense, 2000).
34. See Hasan Altinisik, “First Islamist Protest Against AK Party,” Turkish Daily News, March 1,
2003, pp. A1 & A14; Also see agency news compiled by TDN staff “Turkish people say no to war,”
Turkish Daily News, January 22, 2003, pp. A1 & A14.
35. George W. Bush, “Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,” September
20, 2001. For the original script of President Bush’s address see www.whitehouse.gov.
36. The AKP is widely viewed a continuation of the former Islamic parties, with slight variations and
cosmetic changes, namely the Welfare (Refah) Party and the Virtue (Fazilet) Party. The Refah Party was
banned with a decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court on February 15, 1998. Its successor, the
Fazilet Party faced the same problem and it was banned with a decision of the Court taken on June 22,
2001.
37. Turkish deputies wore white ribbons at a Parliamentary session to signal their opposition to a US
-led war on Iraq. See Dexter Filkins, “Turkish Parliament Asked to Approve US Troops,” The New York
Times, February 26, 2003, p. A10.
254 ✭ MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL
security forces in the country.38  The Armed Forces adopted a cold-blooded approach
and a relatively low-profile attitude in order to preserve its credibility in Turkish
society as an institution that has long been seen as the “guarantor” of the secular and
republican regime in the country, and the “weapon of last resort” against the so-called
fundamentalists who desired to take revenge on the followers of Atatürk’s revolution-
ary principles.39
In addition to concerns over religious extremist groups, territorial integrity and
internal stability of the country were no less important to the military. Having fought
against the insurgencies of the Kurdish separatist organization, the Kurdistan Work-
ers’ Party (PKK), for more than a decade until the mid-1990s, and having suffered
thousands of casualties in these fights, the Army was seriously concerned with the
possibility of the proclamation of a Kurdish state in the northern districts of neighbor-
ing Iraqi territory. Even short of full sovereignty in the foreseeable future, any form
of autonomy that would be gained by the well organized US-backed Kurdish groups
in Iraq, was feared as possibly paving the way to full sovereignty in the medium to
long term, that could also be followed by certain claims on Turkey, such as for terri-
tory and compensation.40
NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE AMERICANS
Thus, the military was indeed willing to take part in the coalition formed by the
US in order to secure a seat for Turkey around the table that would shape post-war
Iraq.41  Yet, due attention was paid so as not to be seen as “warmongers” within Turk-
ish society for the reasons cited above. Hence, military experts conducted painstaking
negotiations with their American counterparts, which resulted on February 8, 2003 in
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that documented in more than a hundred
pages the “rules of engagement” that the parties would observe with regard to the
38. The Turkish Armed Forces followed the developments rather closely since the beginning, and
delegated their frustration with some of the issues to their American counterparts. See “ABD’ye Irak icin
bes uyari verdik” [“We Gave Five Notes to the US for Iraq”] Hürriyet, October 29, 2002. For a statement
of General Hilmi Ozkok, the Chief of Turkish General Staff, see the agency news compiled by TDN staff
“Ozkok: US Troops And Equipment Are Part Of First Bill,” Turkish Daily News, February 22, 2003, pp.
A1 & A14.
39. Ad hoc conversations with military officials in the Turkish General Staff and elsewhere who
wished to remain anonymous.
40. Turkey was concerned with the possibility of proclamation of independence by the Kurds in Iraq
with the close support of the US. See Dexter Filkins, “Turkey Assesses Question of Kurds,” The New
York Times, February 21, 2003, p. A14. Also see Mensur Akgun, “Kuzey Irak’ta hassas dengeler,”
[“Sensitive Balance in Northern Iraq”],  Hürriyet, March 8, 2003.
41. See Dexter Filkins, “Turkish Military Back Role In US Drive On Iraq,” The New York Times,
March 6, 2003, p. A11. Also see the agency news compiled by TDN staff “Army Supports Government
on US Troops, Warns Kurds,” Turkish Daily News, March 6, 2003, pp. A1 & A14.
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respective positions of their troops to be stationed in the Iraqi territory.42  The MOU
could not be put in practice because of the disapproval of the resolution on March 1,
2003.43  A serious implication of the absence of a set of rules of engagement between
Turkey and the US was seen on July 4, 2003 when American soldiers detained a group
of Turkish Special Forces who were operating in northern Iraq.44
The presence of some 1,500 Turkish troops was not at all unknown to the US,
ever since they were stationed in northern Iraq in March 1995, when the first large-
scale Turkish military operation was conducted in the pursuit of PKK elements into
the Iraqi territory.45  Never had the military presence of Turkey in northern Iraq been
a serious issue between Turkey and the US. However, the tide turned with the failure
of the troop-basing resolution to get the approval of the Turkish Parliament.46  The
lack of clear-cut engagement rules between the parties was only a time bomb, and it
went off on the Fourth of July. Paradoxically, the detention of Turkish soldiers for
some 60 hours also provided an opportunity to take a deep breath, to cool down, as
well as to reassess the state of affairs between Turkey and the US.47  There was then a
“delicate balance of anger” between the two allies. A fresh start was thought to be
possible, and the subject then could be how to help the US out in its dealings with the
Iraqi debacle.
EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE FAILURE OF THE TROOP BASING RESOLUTION
Due to the possibility of unwanted developments in northern Iraq which could
end up with the Kurds having the upper hand in the restructuring of the country, the
42. Turkish and American diplomats had intense negotiations for several weeks. Major issues of conten-
tion were the number, as well as the sites, of American troops to be deployed in Turkey and the Turkish
troops in northern Iraq. US did not want to jeopardize a potential strategic alliance with the Kurdish groups
by allowing Turkish troops into their sectors, while Turkey made the US troop basing resolution conditional
upon a similar permit for Turkish troops to cross the Iraqi border. For some details about the document
entitled Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of Turkey and the Government of the
United States of America on the Establishment and Implementation of Basic Policy, Principles, Procedures
and to Determine the Status of Forces to be Provisionally Deployed in Turkey for the Purposes of Possible
Operations Toward Iraq, see Fikret Bila, Sivil Darbe Girisimi ve Ankara’da Irak Savaslari, [Civilian Coup
Attempt and the Iraq Wars in Ankara], (Ankara: Umit Yayincilik, 2003), p.225.
43. See Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey Says No,” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August
2003, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 22-25.
44. Dexter Filkins, “Turkey says US has detained some of its soldiers in northern Iraq,” The New
York Times, July 6, 2003, p. A6. Also see Sedat Ergin “Derhal Ozür Dileyin,” [“Make an Apology Right
Away”], Hürriyet, July 6, 2003, p. 20.
45. See Kemal Kirisci,  “Turkey and the Kurdish Safe Haven in Northern Iraq,” Journal of South
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. XI, No. 3, pp. 21-39.
46. The general mood among the political and academic circles was that, had the resolution not been
disapproved, such unwanted developments would not have taken place. See, Fikret Bila, “Ozel Amaci
Asan Faaliyetler Yasak!” [“Activities that Go Beyond a Specific Purpose are Forbidden”], Milliyet,
September 24, 2003, p. 14.
47. See Douglas Jehl and Dexter Filkins, “Turkey Says US Has Agreed To Free 11 Soldiers
Suspected In Plot To Kill Kurdish Aide,” The New York Times, July 7, 2003, p. A6.
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Turkish government, briefed by the General Staff and the Foreign Ministry officials,
got involved in further negotiations with the Americans in the autumn of 2003. In
these negotiations, the objective was to secure feasible guarantees from the US that
the Kurds would not prevail in the politics of post-war Iraq, especially in the north
where a significant Turkoman population was living alongside the Kurds.48  The pace
and the tone of negotiations were dramatically different than the previous ones. Until
then, an almost constant proportion of the Turkish population was against sending
troops to Iraq where atrocities were mounting, including the deadly attacks on the
United Nations buildings and its personnel resulting in losses of lives. Eventually, a
growing percentage of the population started to acknowledge that the only way to
prevent the future damage that would be caused by the chaotic environment in Iraq
would be to help the US stabilize the country as quickly as possible, and to secure a
promise in return from the US that no Kurdish state would be allowed in northern
Iraq in the years ahead.49
There were also other serious concerns such as the status of the Turkomans in
Iraq and their future constitutional rights. The new Constitution of Iraq is an issue yet
to be worked out by experts from inside and outside the country. Turkey is deeply
concerned with whether the Constitution will have loopholes or shortcomings in terms
of maintaining Iraqi unity. Another major issue of concern to Turkey is the threat of
the PKK, which is using Kandil Mountain on the Iraq-Iran border as a sanctuary for
its approximately 5,000 members. Turkish and American experts have come together
frequently to work out a feasible plan for the elimination of the threat posed by the
PKK. Yet, there are a number of difficulties in taking further effective steps right
away.50  But, the Turkish military had made its pledge to send troops to Iraq implicitly
conditional upon swift measures to be taken by the US against the PKK elements
stationed in northern Iraq. The US did yield to this demand, especially at a time when
there were not many countries volunteering to send troops for the stabilization of Iraq
48. Various sources indicate that 97% of the population of Iraq consists of Muslims, of whom some
65% are Shi‘i and about 30% Sunnis. Christians constitute 3% of total population. When it comes to
ethnic distribution of the population, Arabs constitute 70% of the total population while the Kurds
constitute 15-20%. Turkomans and other groups constitute 10% of the population.
49. According to a public opinion poll conducted by the Superonline, a Turkish Internet broadcasting
company, between August 26, 2003 and September 26, 2003 some 81% of Turks who answered the
polls were against sending Turkish soldiers to Iraq while some 18% of them were supportive of the idea.
However, according to a subsequent poll by the same company conducted a month later between
September 25 and October 25, 2003 the ratio of those who supported the idea to send troops to Iraq
doubled and hit 36%. For the results of the polls refer to the website http://anket.superonline.com.
50. First, and foremost, the Turkish Parliament had passed a bill in August 2003 that gave amnesty  to
PKK members if they gave up their arms and surrendered, provided that they were not involved in
killings in the past. The “amnesty law” expired on February 6, 2004. Still a combined military operation
against the PKK could potentially create a lot more troubles for the US in the political domain both at
home and abroad. Secondly, a military operation against the group in the mountains is estimated to
necessitate some 30,000 US troops that would have to be allocated to conduct combat operations for
more than a month, which are also likely to suffer hundreds of casualties. The US, however, does not
have troops to spare for a prolonged military operation whose political objective and military benefits are
not very clear to most Americans.
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and maintaining peace and security in the country. Some allies of the US feared heavy
casualties while some others were concerned with the legitimacy principle and sought
a new UN resolution.51  Up until mid October-2003, Turkey seemed to have the upper
hand in the negotiations with the US with the capability of making a generous contri-
bution in terms of number of troops and the courage to take over the most dangerous
zones where the American soldiers were under incessant attacks everyday. At that
time, the US Administration seemed to turn a blind eye to the opposition to any
Turkish military presence in Iraq that was voiced fiercely among the Kurds as well as
the Arab world.52
TURKEY’S PERSISTENT DESIRE TO STEP IN IRAQ: A DILEMMA FOR THE US
On October 7, 2003. the Turkish Parliament approved the resolution that would
allow sending troops into Iraqi territory.53  Then the US faced a dilemma. Deploying
Turkish troops in Iraq would, on the one hand, facilitate controlling the most difficult
sectors of the country where US soldiers were being killed or seriously wounded
daily. These casualties were an issue in domestic US politics with those who chal-
lenged President George W. Bush in the run-up to the presidential elections in No-
vember 2004. The Turkish military had gained invaluable experience as well as ex-
pertise in prolonged low-intensity warfare in rough conditions during its fight against
the PKK and also learned a lot and proved itself in peace-keeping and nation-building
efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo and lastly in Afghanistan.54  Hence, Turkey’s offer could
not be easily turned down by the American Administration.55
On the other hand, northern Iraq, which was relatively quieter compared to the
rest of the country, could be seriously disturbed with the Turkish flag flying in sectors
near the Kurdish-controlled zones.56  A Turkish troop deployment in Iraq (possibly to
the northwest of Baghdad) would necessitate establishing a logistical supply route
from Turkey to the deployment area cutting through Kurdish-controlled northern
Iraq. Such an eventuality was by no means acceptable to the Kurdish leaders, who
51. Pakistan made it clear that no troops would be sent to Iraq. See the news compiled by the staff
“Pakistan Asker Gondermiyor,” [“Pakistan Does not Send Troops”] Milliyet, September 24, 2003, p. 16.
52. When it became clear for the US that a new UN Security Council resolution could be approved
and that it would satisfy the condition of legitimacy for a number of countries, especially in the Muslim
world, a series of statements started to emanate from the high levels of the US Administration that
sending Turkish troops in Iraq could be risky. The UNSC adopted Resolution 1511 on October 16, 2003
that provided necessary legal ground to send troops to Iraq for restoring security and stability in the
country. See Felicity Barringer, “Unanimous Vote By UN’s Council Adopts Iraq Plan,” The New York
Times, October 17, 2003, pp. A1 & A12.
53. See William Safire, “Turkey Is Joining Up,” The New York Times, October 8, 2003, p. A31.
54. For an account of Turkey’s contribution to peace operations see “The Contribution of the Turkish
Armed Forces to World Peace” on the website www.byegm.gov.tr.
55. See Asli Aydintasbas, “Why America Needs Turkey in Iraq,” The New York Times, October 10,
2003, p. A31.
56. See Ian Fisher, “Possible Turkish Role Upsets The Iraqi Council,” The New York Times, October
9, 2003, pp. A1 & A12.
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threatened both Turkey and the US with the possibility of armed clashes if Turkish
troops entered northern Iraq, which they claimed to be “Iraqi Kurdistan.” The Turkish
Deputy Chief of General Staff General Ilker Basbug stated quite clearly on October
13, 2003, during a press meeting in response to such threats, that “the Turkish soldiers
would retaliate in kind if and when they are attacked no matter by whom.”57  Such
statements, one after another, put further strain on the decision then yet to be taken in
Washington as to whether Turkish troops should be deployed in Iraq as part of the
stabilization force or not. But as a result of the crossfire of words between Turks and
the Kurds, the US asked Turkey to stay on its side of the border.
The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1511 on October 16,
2003, which legitimized sending military units under the unified command of the US.
But many countries were reluctant to send sufficient troops, due to continuing attacks
on foreigners in Iraq, regardless of a UN mandate.58  It is unclear whether at some
point the US might again seek Turkish troops in Iraq. Should such a request come
from the US, it is hard to predict the stance of the current AKP government and that
of the Turkish military. However, Turkish policy-makers certainly want to retain
influence in the future restructuring of Iraq to prevent the creation of an independent
Kurdish state.59
CONCERNS OF ISRAELIS WITH REGARD TO NORTHERN IRAQ
While Turkish policy-makers and the military are so preoccupied with the con-
tingencies in Iraq and trying to maintain Turkey’s marginal capability to control the
pace of events, the approach of the Israeli policy-makers to the developments seems
to be dramatically different from that of their Turkish allies.60  As stated earlier, be-
yond being a moral issue for the Israelis, the geostrategic value of the northern dis-
tricts of Iraq for the security of Israel is almost unmatched.61   Patrick Clawson of the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy suggests, “Israel’s overwhelming national-
security concern must be Iran.” Given that a presence in Kurdistan would give Israel
57. See the editorial “Genelkurmay: Saldirirlarsa Vururuz,” [“General Staff: We will Shoot if they
Attack”], Hürriyet, October 14, 2003, pp. 1 & 20. Also see Ilnur Cevik, “The Spheres Of Interest Of The
Military,” Turkish Daily News, October 14, 2003.
58. During the NATO’s Heads of States Summit in Istanbul there was intense discussion on the
possible role of the Alliance in restoring the situation in Iraq. However, the outcome is far from being
explicit about what exactly NATO countries could do about stabilizing Iraq.
59. See Michael Gunter, “The Consequences of a Failed Iraqi State: An Independent Kurdish State
in Northern Iraq?,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Spring 2004), Vol. XX, No.3,
pp. 1-12.
60. For a comprehensive coverage of Israeli approach see Shai Feldman (ed.), After the War in Iraq:
Defining the New Strategic Balance, (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2003).
61. For an account of Israel’s historic interest in Iraq and the Iraqis see Gawdat Bahgat, “Iraq and
Israel,” Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies (Fall 2003), Vol. XIX, No. 1, pp. 49-78. Also
see Seymour M. Hersh, “Israeli Agents Operating In Iraq, Iran And Syria,” posted on the website
Democracy Now (www.democracynow.org), June 22, 2004; On the same subject see Seymour M.
Hersh, “As June 30th Approaches Israel Looks To The Kurds,” The New Yorker, June 28, 2004.
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a way to monitor the Iranian nuclear effort, Clawson argues, “it would be negligent for
the Israelis not to be there.”62  Similarly, a former American senior intelligence official
argues that the Israelis’ tie to Kurdistan “would be of greater value than their growing
alliance with Turkey.”63  On the same issue, a former Israeli intelligence officer says “we
love Turkey but have got to keep the pressure on Iran … the Kurds were the last surviving
group close to the United States with any say in Iraq. The only question was how to square
it with Turkey.”64
WMD CAPABILITIES OF IRAN AND PAKISTAN
The threat of Iranian as well as Pakistani ballistic missiles that could be tipped with
weapons of mass destruction, whose ranges can reach any point in the eastern Mediterranean,
looms large.65  It goes without saying that the Iranian clerical regime is deeply hostile to Israel.
Bearing in mind the military capabilities displayed by Iran with a series of test-firings of 1,350
kilometer-range Shahab-3 ballistic missiles since 1998, and the level of their nuclear program
(still in dispute but with development of a weapon possible within a few years), Israel has good
reason to fear a surprise or even maybe a suicidal nuclear first-strike from Iran.66  The Israelis
believe that Iran wants nuclear weapons to further and bolster its flagging revolution, to provide
an alternative to Egyptian secular moderation, and to challenge the military supremacy of Israel
and the United States in the Middle East.67
Israeli analysts have similar concerns with regard to the Pakistani nuclear weap-
ons and ballistic missile capability.68  Even though at present Pakistan is believed to be
62. For a detailed account on Israel’s interest in northern Iraq and its intensifying relations with the
Kurds of Iraq see Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command: the Road from 9/11 to Abu Ghraib, Harper
Collins Publishers, New York, 2004, pp. 351-360. Also see, Shelomoh Nakdimon, Irak ve Ortadogu’da
Mossad (Ceviri Ahmet Ekinci), [Mossad in Iraq and the Middle East (translated by Ahmet Ekinci)],
(Ankara: Elips Kitap, 2004).
63. Hersh, Chain of Command.
64. Hersh, Chain of Command.
65. Iran is believed to possess chemical weapons and ongoing research programs focusing on the
production of biological agents. For further information see Sebnem Udum, “Missile Proliferation in the
Middle East: Turkey and Missile Defense,” Turkish Studies (Autumn 2003), Vol. 4, No.3, pp. 71-102.
Also see Mustafa Kibaroglu “An Assessment of Iran’s Nuclear Program” The Review of International
and Strategic Affairs (Spring 2002), Vol. 1. No. 3, pp. 33-48.
66.  For a detailed study on Iran’s military capabilities see Michael Eisenstadt, Iranian Military Power:
Capabilities and Intentions, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1996). Also see
Anthony H. Cordesman, “Threats and Non-Threats from Iran” in Jamal S. al-Suwaidi (ed.), Iran and the Gulf: A
Search for Stability, (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996).
67. According to an Israeli officer, “when the Iranians have enough fuel for enrichment and the
technology for it, it’s over.” See Steven Erlanger, “Israeli Spy Satellite Ditches After Takeoff,” Interna-
tional Herald Tribune, September 7, 2004, p. 5. Also see David Menashri, Revolution at a Crossroads:
Iran’s Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions, (Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, 1997).
68. For detailed information on Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities see Samina Ahmed and David Cortright
(eds.), Pakistan and the Bomb: Public Opinion and Nuclear Option, Notre Dame, IN: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1998). Also see Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation:
Lessons from South Asia, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1998).
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preoccupied with the threat posed by the Indian nuclear capability, the war on Afghanistan
has shown to the world the degree of “Talibanization of the Pakistani Army,” which has a
good deal of nukes at stock. The more the radical Islamic groups seize control of the
Pakistani army, the greater will be the threat posed to Israel by that country.69  Because, a
radical Islamic leadership may then turn its face from the east (i.e., India) to the west (i.e.,
Israel). This is by no means a scenario that can be taken lightly by Israel, a country
vulnerable to long range ballistic missile attacks that can be tipped with nuclear warheads,
because of the geographical limitations and demographic structure of the country.70
IMPORTANCE OF PREVENTIVE STRIKE CAPABILITY FOR ISRAEL AND THE ROLE OF TURKEY
One must bear in mind that, in case a ballistic missile is fired from Iran toward
Israel, regarding the distances involved, which is approximately 1,100 km, and the veloc-
ity of the missiles, which is in the order of 2 to 4 km per second in their terminal phases,
the total flight time of such a missile would be only a few minutes after launch. Regarding
the limitations of even the most sophisticated anti-ballistic missile shields in intercepting
all  incoming missiles, and the very short duration of flight, it is essential for Israel to be
able to prevent such attacks before they occur. This can be done in various ways. The best
is through gathering timely intelligence that would enable special units to preempt in
order to render the enemy capabilities ineffective.71  Should intelligence units fail to detect
the threat in a timely manner, the next best mode of action from the Israeli perspective
would be to destroy the missiles in their most vulnerable positions (i.e., on the launching
pad) or in the early phase of the launch (i.e., the boost phase). However, in order to be able
to do this, Israeli military units would need to be stationed in areas near the enemy missile
launchers and must be able to act very swiftly on very short notice. Whether it uses
ground-launched anti-missile weapons or aircraft armed with air-to-surface or air-to-air
anti-ballistic missiles, Israel would need to use Turkish air bases and/or the Turkish air-
space to combat a launch from neighboring Iran.72  The military cooperation agreement of
1996 between Turkey and Israel allows such contingencies.73  One may therefore think
that Israel should be satisfied with these guarantees. However, this seems not to be the
case, especially after September 11, 2001.
69. See, Mohammed E. Ahrari, Jihadi Groups, Nuclear Pakistan and the New Great Game, (Carlisle,
PA: US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2001).
70. Interview with Ze’ev Schiff, senior journalist and military affairs editor with Israeli newspaper
Haaretz, July 2001, Istanbul.
71. Israel relies on its spy satellite Ofek-6 to increase surveillance over Iran to be able to have more early
warning in case of a surprise attack. See Steven Erlanger, “Israeli Spy Satellite Ditches After Takeoff,”
International Herald Tribune, September 7, 2004, p. 5.
72. Interviews with Gen. Cevik Bir (Ret.), May 2001 in Ankara and January 2005 in Istanbul.
General Cevik Bir is known for being the “mastermind” of the 1996 military agreement between Turkey
and Israel during his post as the Second Chief of Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces in the mid 1990s.
73.  For more about the Military Education and Cooperation Agreement signed on February 23, 1996
between Turkey and Israel see Tareq Ismael and Mustafa Aydin, Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st
Century, (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.,2003), p 111. Also see Mustafa Kibaroglu, “Turkey and
Israel Strategize” Middle East Quarterly (Winter 2002), Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 61-65.
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ISRAEL’S DOUBTS ABOUT TURKEY’S FUTURE COOPERATION
The tragic events on September 11 are believed, by some in the non-Muslim world in
particular , to have demonstrated the potential of a clash between civilizations, religious motifs
being at the forefront.74  The degree of trauma experienced on that day has unavoidably and
deeply affected the mindsets of policy-makers in the Judeo-Christian West. Hence, one must
admit that, compared with the political controversies of the past,  an age of religious disposition
now seems to have opened. Israel, being a Jewish state, and Turkey with its predominantly
Muslim population may find themselves further apart , if they do not pay attention to centrifugal
forces exerted upon them due to rapidly changing geopolitical realities.
Israel’s toughened stance toward the Palestinians, as well as the serial assassinations of top
Hamas leaders in the spring of 2004, which were proclaimed as an official Israeli strategy in the
war on terror, have created strong reactions in some factions within Turkish society. Large-scale
demonstrations were staged, especially following Friday prayers, in the mosques of big cities
such as Istanbul and Ankara where Israeli flags were burned. Moreover, a couple of innocent
Jewish-Turkish citizens were killed by radical Islamists for no reason other than their mere
religious identity. Amid these events, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan added
further and unprecedented strain with his bitter statements toward Israel. Erdogan harshly criti-
cized Israeli security units in his public speeches for their “indiscriminate killings in Palestine and
not using caution.” He went on to blame his Israeli counterpart Ariel Sharon for “retaliating to
suicide bombings by committing state terror against innocent Palestinians.”75  In an interview
with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Prime Minister Erdogan said “the Israelis are treating the
Palestinians similar to the way they themselves were treated 500 years ago.” During the inter-
view, Erdogan also said, “Turkey favored a revival of the peace process” and added that “the
crisis that had erupted between Israel and Turkey could be overcome if the two sides acted with
sincerity towards each other.”76  The Turkish Premier also said that “our ancestors extended a
helping hand to the Jews in Spain during the Inquisition. During that period, the Jews were the
victims. Today the Palestinians are the victims. The Israelis are bombing civilians from helicop-
ters. They are killing children, women and the elderly and demolishing buildings.”77
74. See Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No.3. (Summer
1993), pp. 22-28.
75. For a number of such statements made by the Turkish Premier see for instance Zübeyde Yalcin
and Evren Mesci “Ve Israil’e sari kart!”, [“And Yellow Card to Israel!”], May 26, 2004, Sabah,
(www.sabah.com.tr).
76. During the course of mounting tension between Turkey and Israel after the war in Iraq because of
Israel’s alleged role in the developments in the country favoring the Kurdish groups in the north, Ariel
Sharon’s desire to meet with Tayyip Erdogan, during a stopover in Istanbul on his way back to Israel
from an official trip, was refused by his Turkish counterpart due to “scarcity of time” and the “short-
notice of the request.” Later on, following the events in the Gaza Strip in Palestine, Tayyip Erdogan
cancelled his planned trip to Israel claiming, “the political atmosphere in the region was not suitable for
such a visit.”
77. For details of this interview translated from Israeli daily Haaretz see “Israil devlet terroru yapiyor”
[“Israel Commits State Terror”], Hurriyet, June 5, 2004 (www.hurriyetim.com.tr). On a similar account
see Abdullah Karakus, “Israil’in yaptigi terror,” [“What Israael Makes is Terror”], April 14, 2004,
Milliyet, (www.milliyet.com.tr).
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Against this background, it is not difficult to understand the reasons why Israeli
decision-makers would not want to depend on Turkey in protecting their country
against possible nuclear missile attacks from Iran and beyond. Israeli diplomats and
policy-makers are concerned with the question of “who can guarantee that Turkey
will allow Israel to use its territory or its airspace, for example in 15 years from today,
in case of a missile attack from Iran or beyond is imminent?”78  The ancestors of the
Islamic party in government today were ousted from power in 1997 with a “post-
modern” coup initiated by the military.79  But, today the AKP is in power with a two-
thirds majority in the Parliament. Hence, Israeli diplomats and policy-makers are also
concerned with “who will come to power in Turkey in 15 years or later,” while they
believe that “Tayyip Erdogan will be the next President of Turkey.” 80
THE ESTATE VALUE OF NORTHERN IRAQ FOR ISRAEL
A conclusion to be drawn from the above argument is: Israel should be looking for
another ally in the region that would serve the very same purpose with fewer unknowns in
the future. The best candidate would be the Kurds in northern Iraq, who are not funda-
mentalist, nor are they likely to have a political system or a bureaucratic mechanism which
might create friction vis-à-vis the expectations of the US or Israel, particularly in the
military domain.81  And the Kurds will be indebted to those who will have contributed, in
one way or another, to achieving their ultimate objective of creating an independent state.
The estate value of northern Iraq stems from its position along the Iranian frontier.
When that territory was under the control of Saddam in the 1980s and early 1990s,
Turkey’s southeast served a similar purpose of lying along the Syrian, Iraqi as well as the
Iranian borders, and thereby sending these capitals the message that their strategic assets
were within the reach of Israeli Air Force. Having been liberated from Saddam’s rule,
northern Iraq itself became accessible to the US and therefore Israel, the latter being a
potential ally of the Kurds. It would only be a matter of formality to station forward
defense units of Israel such as Arrow missiles, as well as the F-16s in northern Iraq in the
years to come, if and when Israel decides to enter into contractual relations with the
Kurdish entity that is gradually emerging. Then, Israeli analysts and policy makers will
not have to worry about the direction of domestic politics and the public sentiment in
Turkey as to whether the next government would honor the highly sensitive security and
defense arrangements between the two countries in the decades to come.
CONCLUSION
The developments taking place in northern Iraq have displayed so far the poten-
tial of a clash of interests of two key countries in the region,  Turkey and Israel. The
78. Interview with Sharon Bar-Li Sa’ar, Israeli Embassy in Ankara. October 2003.
79. See Ilnur Cevik “Ugly Debate Over Erkaya’s Demise,” Turkish Daily News, July 2, 2000.
80. Interview with Sharon Bar-li Sa’ar, Israeli Embassy in Ankara. October 2003.
81. See Seymour Hersh, Chain of Command, pp. 351-360.
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possibility of the emergence of Kurdish self-rule, autonomy, or a full-fledged state in
the north is probably the worst case scenario for Turkey, with regard to the future of
Iraq,82  whereas the very same development may be seen as an opportunity to strengthen
and consolidate the forward defense capability of Israel against the rapidly rising
threat of ballistic missiles with nuclear, chemical or biological warheads, which may
target Israel, posed by countries like Iran and Pakistan as well as other potential
countries in Central Asia where radical Islam is on the rise. If this is the case, Turkey
and Israel may find themselves at odds and they may waste lots of opportunities that
could be beneficial for both parties.
However, there is no serious reason for Israelis to doubt the commitment of a
significant proportion of the Turkish population to the preservation of parliamentary
democracy in the country. There is equally no reason to believe that the powerful
institutions in Turkey, the military being at the forefront, as well as academia, non-
governmental organizations, and various interest groups may ever compromise the
secular characteristic of the republican regime. The stance of the Turkish military is
particularly important in this respect, because the agreement that was reached be-
tween the military establishments of Israel and Turkey back in 1996, and the security
guarantees thereof will remain in force as long as both parties desire it. Therefore,
Israel’s misgivings about Turkey’s assurances in dealing with the threats on the hori-
zon are unfounded. Both countries should do their utmost to build confidence be-
tween them.
One last point to bear in mind is the following: terrorist attacks on September
11, 2001 have shown to the world that in the future non-state actors may stage such
attacks that may cause much greater damage than attacks that can be launched by
states. There exist effective ways and means to deter an attack by a state with the
82. Prior to the first democratic elections in Iraq in over half a century, on January 30, 2005, the top
officials in Turkey, both civilian and military, including the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and the Chief of Turkish General Staff  issued serious warnings to the effect that the legitimacy
and legality of the elections should not be overshadowed by the initiatives of the Kurdish groups in
northern Iraq aiming at changing the demographic structure of Kirkuk and Mosul (both of which are
heavily populated by the Turkomans) by moving in Kurds from rural areas to cast their votes in these
cities with a view to having more Kurds elected to the national and provincial parliaments. Among these
statements, the ones made by the Second Chief of Staff Gen. Ilker Basbug during a press meeting on
January 25, 2005 were, as expected and as usual, the most straightforward pointing at the possibility of
resorting to force, if need be, should the Kurds goso far as to declare Kirkuk to be the capital city of a
would-be independent Kurdish state. Iraqi Kurdish leaders Mas‘ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani were, as
expected and as usual, quick to reply with even more bitter statements touching the nerves of most Turks,
asserting that the proclamation of an independent Kurdish state, with Kirkuk as its capital, was only a
matter of time, and that Turkey and the Turks had no right to say a word about these “internal matters of
the Kurds of Iraq.” For details see, for instance, the Internet news portal www.ntvmsnbc.com. Amid
such crossfire, which unnecessarily raised the tension in an already heated political environment, posi-
tive signals are also coming from higher-ranking officials in  American diplomatic circles suggesting that
the US Administration will be “sensitive to the legitimate rights of the Turkomans in Kirkuk and will
work to make that city a model of intraethnic harmony for the country and the region.” Interview with a
high-ranking diplomat from the US Department of State, January 2005, Boston, MA.
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possibility of retaliating in kind. However, non-state actors such as Al-Qa‘ida do not
have a specific address to retaliate against, nor do they have any strategic assets to
lose. They are ready to sacrifice their lives, and they cannot be paid off with any
material gain. Nothing compares to Heaven for those who dearly believe that they
will get there after implementing their task (e.g., destroying Israel). No missile shields,
no cutting edge military technologies, no forward defense capabilities can effectively
deal with the unprecedented threats posed by such actors.
However, sound and timely intelligence can protect nations which are the targets
of terrorist organizations. By means of intelligence one can either preempt or prevent,
or at least diminish the possible damage that can be caused by such attacks. Intelli-
gence gathering in a geography which has much in common with the Turks’, and
Turkey’s current military and civilian intelligence-gathering capabilities should be
extremely valuable to the Israelis, no matter how powerful they have been in this field
for decades. Against this background, it remains for both the Turks and the Israelis to
look at the greater Middle East from a much wider perspective, by putting aside their
short-term concerns and limited objectives. It should be hoped that the official visit of
the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Abdullah Gul in late December 2004 might
constitute the first step to revitalize the rather long stagnated level of intense and
sincere cooperation in the military and political domains between Turkey and Israel.
If there is a pair of countries in the region whose relationship can result in a “win-
win” situation, these are probably Israel and Turkey.
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